Pervasive Insecurity

We foresee a more pervasive sense of insecurity, which may be as much based on psychological perceptions as physical threats, by 2020.  The psychological aspects, which we have addressed earlier in this paper, include concerns over job security as well as fears revolving around migration among both host populations and migrants.  

Terrorism and internal conflicts could interrupt the process of globalization by significantly increasing the security costs associated with international commerce, encouraging restrictive border control policies, and adversely affecting trade patterns and financial markets.  Although far less likely than internal conflicts, conflict among great powers would create risks to world security.  The potential for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will add to the pervasive sense of insecurity.

Transmuting International Terrorism
The key factors that spawned international terrorism show no signs of abating over the next 15 years.  Experts assess that the majority of international terrorist groups will continue to identify with radical Islam.  The revival of Muslim identity will create a framework for the spread of radical Islamic ideology both inside and outside the Middle East, including Western Europe, Southeast Asia and Central Asia.

• This revival has been accompanied by a deepening solidarity among Muslims caught up in national or regional separatist struggles, such as Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq, Kashmir, Mindanao, or southern Thailand and has emerged in response to government repression, corruption, and ineffectiveness.



• A radical takeover in a Muslim country in the Middle East could spur the spread of terrorism in the region and give confidence to others that a new Caliphate is not just a dream.



• Informal networks of charitable foundations, madrasas, hawalas, [12] and other mechanisms will continue to proliferate and be exploited by radical elements.



• Alienation among unemployed youths will swell the ranks of those vulnerable to terrorist recruitment.

There are indications that the Islamic radicals' professed desire to create a transnational insurgency, that is, a drive by Muslim extremists to overthrow a number of allegedly apostate secular governments with predominately Muslim subjects, will have an appeal to many Muslims.

• Anti-globalization and opposition to US policies could cement a greater body of terrorist sympathizers, financiers, and collaborators.

A Dispersed Set of Actors.  Pressure from the global counterterrorism effort, together with the impact of advances in information technology, will cause the terrorist threat to become increasingly decentralized, evolving into an eclectic array of groups, cells, and individuals.  While taking advantage of sanctuaries around the world to train, terrorists will not need a stationary headquarters to plan and carry out operations.  Training materials, targeting guidance, weapons know-how, and fund-raising will increasingly become virtual (i.e., online).  

The core al-Qa'ida membership probably will continue to dwindle, but other groups inspired by al-Qa'ida, regionally based groups, and individuals labeled simply as jihadists—united by a common hatred of moderate regimes and the West—are likely to conduct terrorist attacks.  The al-Qa'ida membership that was distinguished by having trained in Afghanistan will gradually dissipate, to be replaced in part by the dispersion of the experienced survivors of the conflict in Iraq.  We expect that by 2020 al-Qa'ida will have been superceded by similarly inspired but more diffuse Islamic extremist groups, all of which will oppose the spread of many aspects of globalization into traditional Islamic societies.

• Iraq and other possible conflicts in the future could provide recruitment, training grounds, technical skills and language proficiency for a new class of terrorists who are “professionalized” and for whom political violence becomes an end in itself.



• Foreign jihadists—individuals ready to fight anywhere they believe Muslim lands are under attack by what they see as “infidel invaders”—enjoy a growing sense of support from Muslims who are not necessarily supporters of terrorism.

Even if the number of extremists dwindles, however, the terrorist threat is likely to remain.  Through the Internet and other wireless communications technologies, individuals with ill intent will be able to rally adherents quickly on a broader, even global, scale and do so obscurely.  The rapid dispersion of bio- and other lethal forms of technology increases the potential for an individual not affiliated with any terrorist group to be able to inflict widespread loss of life.  

Weapons, Tactics, and Targets.
In the past, terrorist organizations relied on state sponsors for training, weapons, logistical support, travel documents, and money in support of their operations.  In a globalized world, groups such as Hizballah are increasingly self-sufficient in meeting these needs and may act in a state-like manner to preserve “plausible deniability” by supplying other groups, working through third parties to meet their objectives, and even engaging governments diplomatically.

Most terrorist attacks will continue to employ primarily conventional weapons, incorporating new twists to keep counterterrorist planners off balance.  Terrorists probably will be most original not in the technologies or weapons they employ but rather in their operational concepts—i.e., the scope, design, or support arrangements for attacks.

• One such concept that is likely to continue is a large number of simultaneous attacks, possibly in widely separated locations.

While vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices will remain popular as asymmetric weapons, terrorists are likely to move up the technology ladder to employ advanced explosives and unmanned aerial vehicles.  

The religious zeal of extremist Muslim terrorists increases their desire to perpetrate attacks resulting in high casualties.  Historically, religiously inspired terrorism has been most destructive because such groups are bound by few constraints.  

The most worrisome trend has been an intensified search by some terrorist groups to obtain weapons of mass destruction.  Our greatest concern is that these groups might acquire biological agents or less likely, a nuclear device, either of which could cause mass casualties.

• Bioterrorism appears particularly suited to the smaller, better-informed groups.  Indeed, the bioterrorist's laboratory could well be the size of a household kitchen, and the weapon built there could be smaller than a toaster.  Terrorist use of biological agents is therefore likely, and the range of options will grow.  Because the recognition of anthrax, smallpox or other diseases is typically delayed, under a “nightmare scenario” an attack could be well under way before authorities would be cognizant of it.



• The use of radiological dispersal devices can be effective in creating panic because of the public's misconception of the capacity of such attacks to kill large numbers of people.

With advances in the design of simplified nuclear weapons, terrorists will continue to seek to acquire fissile material in order to construct a nuclear weapon.  Concurrently, they can be expected to continue attempting to purchase or steal a weapon, particularly in Russia or Pakistan.  Given the possibility that terrorists could acquire nuclear weapons, the use of such weapons by extremists before 2020 cannot be ruled out.

We expect that terrorists also will try to acquire and develop the capabilities to conduct cyber attacks to cause physical damage to computer systems and to disrupt critical information networks.

The United States and its interests abroad will remain prime terrorist targets, but more terrorist attacks might be aimed at Middle Eastern regimes and at Western Europe.

Intensifying Internal Conflicts
Lagging economies, ethnic affiliations, intense religious convictions, and youth bulges will align to create a “perfect storm,” creating conditions likely to spawn internal conflict.  The governing capacity of states, however, will determine whether and to what extent conflicts actually occur.  Those states unable both to satisfy the expectations of their peoples and to resolve or quell conflicting demands among them are likely to encounter the most severe and most frequent outbreaks of violence.   For the most part, those states most susceptible to violence are in a great arc of instability from Sub-Saharan Africa, through North Africa, into the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and South and Central Asia and through parts of Southeast Asia.  Countries in these regions are generally those “behind” the globalization curve.

• The number of internal conflicts is down significantly since the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the breakup of the Soviet Union and Communist regimes in Central Europe allowed suppressed ethnic and nationalist strife to flare.  Although a leveling off point has been reached, the continued prevalence of troubled and institutionally weak states creates conditions for such conflicts to occur in the future.

Internal conflicts are often particularly vicious, long-lasting, and difficult to terminate.  Many of these conflicts generate internal displacements and external refugee flows, destabilizing neighboring countries.

• Sub-Saharan Africa will continue to be particularly at risk for major new or worsening humanitarian emergencies stemming from conflict.  Genocidal conflicts aimed at annihilating all or part of a racial, religious, or ethnic group, and conflicts caused by other crimes against humanity—such as forced, large-scale expulsions of populations—are particularly likely to generate migration and massive, intractable humanitarian needs.

Some internal conflicts, particularly those that involve ethnic groups straddling national boundaries, risk escalating into regional conflicts.  At their most extreme, internal conflicts can produce a failing or failed state, with expanses of territory and populations devoid of effective governmental control.  In such instances, those territories can become sanctuaries for transnational terrorists (like al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan) or for criminals and drug cartels (such as in Colombia).

Rising Powers:  Tinder for Conflict?
The likelihood of great power conflict escalating into total war in the next 15 years is lower than at any time in the past century, unlike during previous centuries when local conflicts sparked world wars.  The rigidities of alliance systems before World War I and during the interwar period, as well as the two-bloc standoff during the Cold War, virtually assured that small conflicts would be quickly generalized.  Now, however, even if conflict would break out over Taiwan or between India and Pakistan, outside powers as well as the primary actors would want to limit its extent.  Additionally, the growing dependence on global financial and trade networks increasingly will act as a deterrent to conflict among the great powers—the US, Europe, China, India, Japan and Russia.

This does not eliminate the possibility of great power conflict, however.  The absence of effective conflict resolution mechanisms in some regions, the rise of nationalism in some states, and the raw emotions on both sides of key issues increase the chances for miscalculation.

• Although a military confrontation between China and Taiwan would derail Beijing's efforts to gain acceptance as a regional and global power, we cannot discount such a possibility.  Events such as Taiwan's proclamation of independence could lead Beijing to take steps it otherwise might want to avoid, just as China's military buildup enabling it to bring overwhelming force against Taiwan increases the risk of military conflict.



• India and Pakistan appear to understand the likely prices to be paid by triggering a conflict.  But nationalistic feelings run high and are not likely to abate.  Under plausible scenarios Pakistan might use nuclear weapons to counter success by the larger Indian conventional forces, particularly given Pakistan's lack of strategic depth.

Should conflict occur that involved one or more of the great powers, the consequences would be significant.  Advances in modern weaponry—longer ranges, precision delivery, and more destructive conventional munitions—create circumstances encouraging the preemptive use of military force.  The increased range of new missile and aircraft delivery systems provides sanctuary to their possessors.

Until strategic defenses become as strong as strategic offenses, there will be great premiums associated with the ability to expand conflicts geographically in order to deny an attacker sanctuary.  Moreover, a number of recent high-technology conflicts have demonstrated that the outcomes of early battles of major conflicts most often determine the success of entire campaigns.  Under these circumstances, military experts believe preemption is likely to appear necessary for strategic success.

• Countries without nuclear weapons, especially in the Middle East and Northeast Asia, may decide to seek them as it becomes clear that their neighbors and regional rivals already are doing so.



• The assistance of proliferators, including former private entrepreneurs such as the A.Q. Khan network, will reduce the time required for additional countries to develop nuclear weapons.

Chemical and Biological Weapons.  Developments in CW and BW agents and the proliferation of related expertise will pose a substantial threat, particularly from terrorists, as we have noted.

• Given the goal of some terrorist groups to use weapons that can be employed surreptitiously and generate dramatic impact, we expect to see terrorist use of some readily available biological and chemical weapons.

Countries will continue to integrate both CW and BW production capabilities into apparently legitimate commercial infrastructures, further concealing them from scrutiny, and BW/CW programs will be less reliant on foreign suppliers.

• Major advances in the biological sciences and information technology probably will accelerate the pace of BW agent development, increasing the potential for agents that are more difficult to detect or to defend against. Through 2020 some countries will continue to try to develop chemical agents designed to circumvent the Chemical Weapons Convention verification regime.

Delivery Systems.  Security will remain at risk from increasingly advanced and lethal ballistic and cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).  States almost certainly will continue to increase the range, reliability, and accuracy of the missile systems in their inventories.  By 2020 several countries of concern probably will have acquired Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs) capable of threatening the US Homeland if brought closer to US shores.  Both North Korea and Iran probably will have an ICBM capability well before 2020 and will be working on improvements to enhance such capabilities, although new regimes in either country could rethink these objectives.  Several other countries are likely to develop space launch vehicles (SLVs) by 2020 to put domestic satellites in orbit and to enhance national prestige.  An SLV is a key stepping-stone toward an ICBM:  it could be used as a booster in an ICBM development.